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THE EXPERIENCE OF BANKING SUPERVISION IN
FINANCIAL SEGTOR SURVEILLANGE
By
MR. O.I.IMALA*
INTRODUCTION

emerging market economies. These
crises have resulted in substantial

am pleased to have been
invited to present a paper on
"The Experience of Banking
Supervision in Financial Sector

macroeconomic and f iscal costs.

Bank failures are widely

I

perceived to have greater adverse
effects on the economy than the
failure of other types of businesses.

Surveillance" as part of the 5th Annual
Seminar for Finance Correspondents

They are viewed to be more damaging
than other failures because of the fear
that they may spread in domino fashion
throughout the banking system, felling

and Business Editors. I believe the
event was arranged to enhance their

understanding of financial sector
issues so that relevant authentic
information can be properly
disseminated.
The timing of the seminar is
considered most appropriate in the

solvent as well as insolvent banks.
MR. O.I. IMALA

2.0

light of recent developments,

particularly in the banking industry.
We were recently inundated with
rumors, publications and refutals
about the financial condition of some
banks. We are confident that this forum
will assist in bridging the information
gap between the Cenilal Bank and the

public at large which, is one of the
key objectives of the seminar.

I would therefore like

to

commend the organizers of this
seminar for such a thoughtful theme
for discussion. The rest of this paper

will highlight the importance

of
Financial Sector Regulation and
Supe rvision; Tech n iques of

Supervision; Symptoms and Causes
of Distress, measures put in place by
the Regulatory/Supervisory authorities

to guard against future systematic
distress and lastly the Role of
Multilateral Agencies. At the end of
the discussion, it will become obvious
why there will be no need to ask me

about the health of the banking
system.

Thus, the failure of an individual bank

introduces the possibility of systemwide failures or systemic risk. Bank
failures have been and willcontinue to
be a major public policy concern in all
countries and that explain the fact that
banks are regulated more rigorously
than other industries.

IMPORTANCEOF
FINANCIALSECTOR
REGULATIONAND
SUPERVISION

2.1 A country's financial sector is the
major channelthrough which funds are

mobilized for borrowing and lending
transactions. A poorly regulated or
managed financialsector or one with
insufficient capital for the risks

it

takes,

2.3

Available evidence suggests

that the poor performance of banking
experienced in almost all countries in
the lasttwo decades reflects primarily
regulatory or government failure rather

can increase a country's vulnerability
to financial crises.

than market failures. One major

lmproved financial sector

in the last decade has been the
issuance of a set of prudential

regulation and supervision can help
ensure that financial institutions take

element of Regulation and Supervision

measures aimed at imparting strength

adequate steps to manage risks.
Appropriate financial sector policies

to the banking system as well as
ensuring safety and soundness

can also help establish deep and liquid

through greater transparency and

domestic capital markets, which will
reduce the incentive for excessive
external borrowings. ln general,
improved financial sector regulation

accountability.

2.4

and supervision can help prevent crises

The prevention of the reoccurrence of banking problems
require a better developed market-

by making national economies less

assisted prudential regulation as well

vulnerable to adverse developments at
home and abroad.

as appropriate incentives. For

2.2

Financial Sector crises have
occurred in many countries in recent
decades, both in developed as well as

example, part of the strategy to
strengthen the banking system in
Nigeria include restructuring the
system of inspection particularly the
off-site suryeillance, enhancing the role

- Mr. O. L lmala is the Director, Banking Supervision Depariment, Central Bank of Nigeria. Being the brt of a paper delivered at the fifth
Seminar for Finance Correspondents and Business Editors held at lmo Concorde Hotel, Owerri, lmo State from 26th - 28th January, 2004.
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of eXernal auditors, and strengthening

examinations by focusing attention on

lncessant complaints by

corporate governance, internal controls

specific bank operational areas that

and audit procedures. All these will

may need close supervisory attention.

customers, of banks' inability
to meet maturing obligations
Desperate borrowing, that is
borrowing at interest rates

be discussed in detail later in the
paper.

3.2.2

At the aggregate level, off-site

surveillance systems can
3.0

TECHNIOUESOF
SUPERVISION

Essentially, there are two
main techniques of supervision,
namely, on-site examination and off-

site supervision employed in the
surveillance process.

3.1

On-site Examination entails

physical presence of regulators in the
financial institutions to evaluate their
internal controls, compliance with the
laws and regulations governing their
operations with a view to determining
their overall risk exposure. Emphasis

is placed on their capital, asset

market rate;

aggregate data may constitute the first
evidence available to bank supervisors
of significant changes in the condition
of the banking system - changes that
might require prompt changes in the
overall bank superuisory policy.
Off-site su rveillance systems typically
focus on a variety of key bank financial

position and overdraft with the
CBN.

3.3

lt should be emphasized that

quality, quality of management, the
strength of earnings and the adequacy
of liquidity.

always to be employed as supplement

to on-site examinations not

3.1.1

On-site examination enables

is crucial for the supervisory process

he Regulators/Superuisors to have a first
hand and detailed knowledge of a

such as the quality of a bank's loan
portfolio or the quality of a bank's

financial institution's operations,

internal policies and procedures can
only be effectively evaluated through
on-site examinations. Simply stated,

procedure, controls and management

informed judgment on its overall
financial condition and compliance with

as
substitutes. Certain information that

off-site surveillance and on-site
examination should be viewed as

banking and other f inancial

complements, each of which produces

institution's laws and regtrlations.

useful, but different information that
contributes to an effective supervisory

3.2

Off-sitesurveillancesystems,
on the other hand, are designed to
accomplish a number of objectives.
The most important is probably their
serving as an "early warning device"

to detect emerging bank financial
problem. This is accomplished by
analyzing key bankfinancial ratios and
otherfinancial data that are generated
from periodic bank financial reports that
are submitted to the supervisor.

3.2.1 An off-site

surveillance

system can also contribute to a more
efficient use of examiners' resources
by giving priority to the examination of
banks that are experiencing problems

or which appear to be significantly
increasing their risk exposure. The
availability of off-site surveillance
reports and analyses can help
examiners to prepare for on-site bank

Window dressing of financial
records;and
Persistent adverse clearing

lf timely intervention is not
undertaken, the symptom may
lead to full-blown distress.

4.2

Causes

ratios covering such important areas
as earnings, asset quality, capital and
reserves, and liquidity.

off-site surveillance systems are

which are assessed to arrive at an

that are higher than the

be

employed by bank supervisors to
monitor the financial condition and
performance of the entire banking
system. ln some cases, these

program.

4.0

SYMPTOMSAND
CAUSESOFDISTRESS
Banking distress is described

The causes of distress can be

categorized into two broad groups
namely, internal and external. The
internal causes of distress include

weak management, inadequate
capital base, fraudulent and corrupt
practices of owners and managers as

well as poor asset/liability

management. On the other hand,
external factors of distress include

macro-economic i nstability,
inadequate legal framework and
structure, delay in the implementation

of supervisory actions towards
distressed institutions, economic
recession, adverse external shocks,
and balance of payment difficulties.
These are elaborated below:

4.2.1

INTERNAL FACTORS

(i)

Weak Management

An important factor that has
caused distress in the Nigerian financial
system is weak management. Over the

as a situation where a bank suffers
from severe financial operational and
managerial weaknesses, which have

years, the number of professionals
available in the financial system,

rendered it incapable of meeting its
obligations to its customers, owners
and the rest of the economy as and

expansion that followed liberalisation.

particularly in the banking sector, has

been dwindling with the rapid

when due.

This resulted in relatively inexperienced
staff being saddled withthe management

4.1

of some banks leading to excessive
risk taking, poor credit quality and

Symptoms

By symptoms, we referto the
various indications that a bank is about

to

become distressed. Such

symptoms include:

Frequent board
squabbles;

50

inadequate internal controls.

(ii)

lnadequate Capital

Banks are expected to
room

maintain adequate capital to absorb

operational shocks or unexpected
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losses, support their level of
operations, operate profitably and
consequently contribute towards
promoting a sound financial system.
It is for these reasons that the Central
Bank of Nigeria periodically prescribes

minimum capital requirements in the

form of minimum paid-up and the
capital to risk-weighted asset ratio.
The minimum capitaladequacy ratio
requirement has remained at the
international standard of 8% and this

is expected to become 10% from
January 2004. lnability to meet the
minimum capital requirement was one

of the criteria used for classifying

liquidity risk, which, in turn weakened

intended to ensure a robusl and more

thus precipitating a run on some of the

efficient and effective regulatory
regime. For example, the power
granted to the CBN Governor to
quickly take actions intended to

banks.

4.2.2

EXTERNALFACTORS

(i) Macro Economic Instability
This can cause distress in the
financial system. For example, when

there is economic recession and
output declines over a period of time,
some borrowers may find it difficult to

repay their loans as a result of low
sales. Similarly, inflationary conditions

could adversely affect deposit

banks as unhealthy.

mobilisation by banks as households

(iii)

would spend a greater proportion of
their income on durable items of

Fraudulent and
Corrupt Practices

unprofessional behaviour of some bank

consumption. Both events could pose
liquidity problems to a bank. Since
the early 80s, Nigeria has had many
economic problems including high

owners and managers. Revelations
from the Failed Banks Recovery of
Debts and Financial Malpractices

inflation, depreciating value of the
naira, large fiscal deficits, external
debts overhang and slow groMh.

The problem of weak
management is compounded by the

Tribunal, showed that such owners and

managers obtained loans without

(i

i)

proper documentation and adequate
collaterals. The practice has nottotally
stopped. Most of those who obtained
loans in that manner, had no intention

of repaying. Corrupt practices also
include the inflation of contracts,
insider abuse and the receipt of
brokerage on deposits collected. All

these have contributed to the

Political lnterference

hardly repaid. Similarly, unstable
political environment could contribute

(.v)

5.0

of majority of these banks, were
mainly loans and advances that
became non-performing. Other
assets, such as treasury securities,
investments and cash, accounted for

a small proportion of their asset
portfolio. The deterioration in asset
quality was not provided for because of

inadequate loan loss provision. This
situation increased the dependence of
banks on external funds. The profile

of poor assets and
nt

liability

Enhanced Paid-Up
Capital

One of the major causes of
bank distress as already identified is
inadequate capital. Consequently, the
regulatory authorities, have reviewed
the minirnum capital base for banks

and other financial institutions, at
various times. The current minimum
paid-up capital requirement for
existing banks is N1 billion, and N2
billion for new banks. ln addition to
the above minimum paid-up capital
requirement, the CBN also ensures
that banks'total capital base vis-d-vis

their level of assets and risks is in
accordance with the BASEL capital

5.3

banks whereby loans granted through
the influence of those in authority, were

system.

suffered from poor assets and liabilities
management. The portfolios of assets

5.2

Undue political interference in

the affairs of a bank, could lead to
distress. This is typified by the
experience of government owned

ltlany of the problem banks

seeking prior approval of the political
authorities made a big difference.

accord, which currently is a minimum
requirement ol8"/o.

to loss of confidence in the financial
system, engendering a run on the

Liabilities Management

address distress symptoms without

and lnstability

weakening of the ability of the banks
to perform their functions efficiently
and creditably.
Poor Assets and

before the National Assembly were

the public confidence in the banks,

Stable and Genuine
CapitalFunds

The regulatory authorities
also ensure that capital injection into
banks, are genuine and stable. ln this
regard, the Central Bank of Nigeria,
issued a circular preventing borrowing
from the banking system, or the use

of criminal funds to fund the
capitalization of banks.

MEASURES PUT IN PLACE
BYTHE REGULATORY/

5.4

Review of Requirementsfor

Appointment to the Boards

SUPERVISORY

and Top Management of

AUTHORITIES TO GUARD
AGAINSTFUTURE
SYSTEMIC DISTRESS

Banks
To promote the quality of the

ln orderto avoid the pitfalls of

management of banks, the Central

the past, the Central Bank of Nigeria
had taken a combination of measures

Bank of Nigeria, reviewed upwards the
requirements for appointments into the

to prevent the re-occurrence of distress

Boards and top managements of
banks. Apart from the educational

in the system. These measures are
discussed as follows:

qualification and years of experience

5.1

prospective bank directors and top

Enabling Legal
Framework

The successive reviews of the
Banking Act of 1969 in 1991 , 1999 and
the proposed amendment which is

the banks to
51

requirements as stipulated for
management, they are also expected

to pass the "fit and proper" persons
test.

Vol.28 No.

Additional
Responsibilities for Bank
Directors

5.5

The CBN ensures that Bank
directors abide by the Code of Conduct
which is subscribed to by all directors.
For example a director is, among others;

.

Prohibited f rom obtaining
unsecured advances or loan of
an aggregate amount in excess
of N50,000.00 whether or not
such facilities are obtained by

him singly or jointly with other

o
o
.
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directors.
Required to ensure that he is not
in a position where his personal
interest would conflict with his

the area of Bank Analysis System

responsible for the implementation of

(BAS), which is a software developed

the New Capital Accord (Accord ll)
which is expected to become

to process the monthly returns
submitted by banks. The investment
in information technology has equally
been followed by specialized training
of Bank Examiners both locally and

operational by January 2007.
5.9

abroad and this has significantly
narrowed the lT gap between the
operators and regulators and therefore
enhanced operational eff iciency.

Establishmentof the
Financial Services
Regulation Coordinating
Committee(FSRCC)

ln addition to capacity

ln recognition of the need for
the co-ordination of regulatory efforts,

building the regulator has adopted the

the FSRCC was established with

use of modern techniques of
supervision e.g. consolidated
supervision of banks, risk-focused
supervision, through participation in
various training programme organized

membership drawn from the regulatory
authorities in charge of the various sub-

sectors of the financial system,
including banking, insurance, stock
broking and other capital market

by the other supervisory agencies
such as the Financial Services

activities.

Committee are among others;to

becomes bankrupt or convicted

Authorities of the UK and the Federal
Reserve Bank of the United States of
America. Allthese efforts have resulted

of an offence involving dishonesty

in a stronger and more effective

orfraud.

supervisory regime.

duties and responsibilities
Will be disqualified if any of his
loans in a bank is classified lost

Shall cease to hold office if he

The objectives of the

a

coordinate the supervision of
financial institutions especially
conglomerates;

a Deliberate on

problems

experienced by any member in
5.6

Establishment of a
Credit Bureau

5.8

Establishment of the CBl,l/
on
Supervision

NDIC Committee

its relationship with any financial

o

To minimize the incidence of

non-performing credits, the Central

Arising from the systemic

Bank of Nigeria established the Credit
Bureau, to provide information on the

distress of the 1990s the CBN and NDIC

system's exposure to individual
borrowers in various banks. Wilh this,

the activities of multiple borrowers
within the system are brought to
focus, as the system provides a
comprehensive report on each
individual's borrowing of N1 millionand
above, in allthe banks.

5.7

jointly constituted a committee on
Problem banks, essentially with a view
to resolving the crisis in the system.

By the year 2000, with the

substantially fulfilled, a refocused
committee named'The CBN/NDIC
Committee on Supervision came into
being. The committee had an
expanded mandate and was charged

with the responsibility of putting in
place pro-active policies and

TechnQues of Supervis$on

guidelines for the banking system as

distinct from reacting to market
The CBN has continued to

invest considerable amount of
resources to develop human and
material resources in ensuring adequate
monitoring of the financial system. For
example, more professionals are being

recruited into the supervisory arm of

the CBN, they are exposed to

The committee has as its
chairman the Deputy Governor of the
CBN while the Managing Director of
the NDIC is the vice Chairman.
Some of the achievements of
the Committee include the issuance

of the

Contingency Planning

Framework for Systemic Distress in
July 2002, the review of the Capital

The CBN has equalty invested

Adequacy Computation Format to

information technology particularly in

agency in its relationship with any
group of financial institutions;

Articulate the strategies for the
promotion of safe, sound and
efficient practices by financial
intermediaries.
So far the Committee has been

able to achieve its mandate
through information sharing and
the harmonization of laws relating
to the regulation of the financial
institutions in the counlry.

5.10 Uniform Assessment of
Banks' Financial Condition

situations as they occur.

structured Bank Examiners' Courses
as well as On-the-Job training.

substantial resources in the area of

Eliminate any information gap
encountered by any regulatory

mandate of the committee having been

Adoptionof Modem

Capacity Building and the

.

institution;

bring it into full alignment with the Basel

standard. The Committee
52

is

The introduction of the
Prudential Guidelines in 1991 provided

a uniform basis (objective

and

subjective criteria) for assessing
banks' risk assets with a view to
determining the overallcondition of the

banks. This measure also assisted
in checking unrealistic "paper profits"

declared by banks. The CBN, in recent

times, has turned its focus on the
huge profits being declared by banks
particularly in the face of declining or
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poor performance of the other sectors
of the Nigerian economy. An income

prevention, management and
containment of banking systemic

audit is carried out to ascertain that

crisis.

whatever income has been reported in
the books of the banks has actually

enable the supervisory authorities to

been eamed and therefore prevent the

Its implementation would

distribution of unearned income

reduce the likelihood of the occurrence
of a systemic distress by sharpening

through dividend payout.

supervisory processes and inducing

self-regulation amongst banks'

The Nigeria Accounting

management.

institutions to recognize suspicious

activities.
6.0 Role of

The Central Bank of Nigeria
has continued to work with several
multilateral agencies to improve and
strengthen its financial system.

Some of these agencies
(..)

non-bank financial institutions, to
ensure uniformity in transactions/

New Regulatory Approach
for Enforcing Compliance by

include the World Bank, the lMF, The
Financial Stability lnstitute (FSl), The

Banks

Bank for International Settlement
(BlS), The Basel Committee, The

financial repoting.

5.11

lncreased Supervisory
Surveillance in the
Banking System

Apart f rom the above
measures, the CBN has continued to
hold regular meetings with individual
bank's board and management, to

discuss issues relating to their
operations and performance. ln the
same vein, it has adopted the holding

Multilateral

Agencies

standard Board, also issued various
accounting standards, for banks and

.

This approach essentially'
transfers the costs and burden

Toronto Leadership Training Centre to

mention a few. These agencies have

of investigating serious malpractices

developed new intemational responses

by banks to those institutions that

and surveillance mechanisms to
address various forms of banking
crisis. Such responses include the
IMF/World Bank Financial Sector

breach the rules and regulations.

The process involves the
appointment by the CBN, of a
consultant, who must be one of the
reputable bank auditors, but not the
particular bank's external auditors.

Assessment Program (FSAP) and the
development of lntemational Standards

such as the Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision. All

The consultant's repoft, which shall be
strictly confidential, shall be submitted
to the CBN for consideration and final
decision after a fair review of same with

these standards help to identify and
address vulnerabilities in financial

the affected bank. lt is expected that

standards and good practices by

solicit their support to ensure a safe
and sound financial system. With
such close interaction, meaningful

this approach will enable the CBN and

member countries.

NDIC to use its limited resources,
specifically the field examiners, to

international f inancial stability through

revelations have been made aboutthe
goings-on in the financial system and

adequately focus on its primary
responsibility of conducting routine

these form the basis for proactive

examination on the banks while it will
act as a deterrent to banks' tendency
to engage in irregularities which are
capable of destroying the bank, if not
checked.

7.0 Conclusion

(iii)

surveillance, the importance of
financial sector regulation and

ol periodic meetings with auditors of
banks as a strategy for slnring experience
on developments in banks as well as to

regulatory/supervisory action.

5.12

lssuance of Guidelines to
Redirect the Operations of
Banks

The CBN has issued various
guidelines to the banks to moderate
their exposure to severalforms of risks,
achieve uniformity/standardization in
reporting formats and comply with
international best p ractices.

Know Your Customer (KYC)

Guidelines
The KYC manualis intended
to serve as a further guide to banks

and other financial institutions in
Nigeria on the procedures necessary

issued by the Bank are discussed

for the proper knowledge of their
customers. There is no doubt that

below:-

having suff icient information about your

Some of the recent guidelines

(.)

The Contingency Planning

customer and making use of that
information is the most effective

Framework

weapon against being used to launder

for

Banking

SysfrnicCrisis.'
The framework consists of a set of
identified policies,"actions and

processes necessary

for

the

the proceeds of crime. ln addition to
minimizing the risk of being used for
illicit activities, it provides protection
against fraud, reputation and financial
risks and enables individual financial

53

systems, and help the observance of

They also help to promote
enhanced information exchange and
international cooperation in financial
market supervision and surveillance.

This paper has highlighted the
key issues involved in financialsector

supervision, and the techniques of
supervision. The paper also discussed
the symptoms and causes of distress,

the measures put in place by the
regulatory/supervisory authorities to
guard against systemic distress and
the role of multinational agencies, all

geared towards the attainment of
domestic and international financial
stability.
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stakeholders. Such revelations as of
Enron, Tyco and Q-west elicited such
public reactions and disbelief like the

engineering or re-engineering, a good
number of which may actually be

22.

deceptive ancUor a mere postponement
of the evil day.

by bankers, even at the topmost

On antecedents, there have
been several cases of abuse of trust

"How could something so far

20.

reachinghave happened witr so litUe

about corporate govemance carries us
all away, let us look across the Atlantic

echelon of the profession in Nigeria.
This is epitomized by the bank failures
and license revocations of the early to
mid-1990's and the very recent cases
of Savannah Bank of Nigeria Plc and

where there have been several European

Peak Bank Limited.

following:

warning?"

17.

- Richard Maclean

Before the American noise

The warning expected by the

cases. These include Comroad and

likes of Maclean was supposed to
come from the information that the

EM.TV of Germany, Lemout & Hauspie
of Belgium,andthe Dutch Ahold. Ahold

Good corporate governance is
assured through reliability ol arcou nti ng

organizations concerned made

in particular, overstated income by
booking income that had not been

allows early warning to all stakeholders,

available to their stakeholders. These

developments made a mess of the

much touted market discipline,
especially for companies that are listed
on the stock exchange and presumed
to be subject to market scrutiny. After

all, there have also been cases of
deliberate misinformation of the maket

especially the executive leadership and
regulatory authorities.The real problem

case of Ahold is similar to what

groups become part of the compromise.

happened at Union Dicon Salt Plc and
Unilever Nigeria Plc.

participants in public issues, and huge

21.

more fundamental to the financial
sector of the Nigerian economy
(especially, the banking sub-sector).
The nature of the business and the
antecedents of the operators of
Nigerian banks dictate this. Banking
business relies largely on funds
provided by depositors and other
customers, making equity an

18.

Yet, the spate of failures and

strange; it was the sheer volume that
jolted everybody. This calls to mind the
collapse ol Baring Brothers (a British

merchant bank that was over 200
years old), through the mindless
dealings of a 28-year old Nick Leeson
at the bank's Singapore outpost! Of
course, it was a case of severalthings
left undone by those responsible for
supervision
internal controls were

-

compromised, and the regulatory
authorities were also indicted forfailing to

follow through their

earlier

recommendations for firming internal

and other informationabout banks that

earned, in order to present an earning
groMh trend that obviously was as
unrealistic as it was unsustainable. The

sums of money had been invested in
stocks that otherwise would have not
attracted as much as a glance.

revelations was nof completely

23.

Coporate governance

is

even

insignificant source of trading funds.

More specifically, customers of
Nigerian banks, in the aggregate,
accounted for between 83.75% and
97.82% of banks' business volume

arises when these two stakeholder

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL STABILITY

24.

lndeed, much of what exists
in corporate governance and how it
affects the stability of the financial
sector arises lrom past experiences,
both within and outside Nigeria. The
new Basle Accord takes this into

cognizance by delineating 12 key
standards for sound financial systems,
whose international acceptance varies

from one country to another. This
notwithstanding, they are accepted
generally as minimum requirements
that should serve as standards for
every system. One major attribute of

(i.e., the balance sheet footing) in the
1990's and early 2000's. The evidence

the new accord is its data/information

of this is in the percentage of total
liabilities of banks that equity
represented during that period, as

technicality of the statistical analysis
implied. This alone raises concerns
about good corporate governance,
especially when financial institutions

follows:

requirements and the sheervolume and

controls.

19. What perhaps drew the
attention of the entire world to
corporate governance was the
magnitude ol deceit in Enronandlhe

fact that the saga involved Arthur
Andersen, which was a well-respected

audit firm of international repute. The

double "tragedy" was the fact that
Enron was brg and Andersen was
deemed extremely p rofessional! The
root of it all was that debts were
deliberately taken off-balance-sheet to

create a false impression about the

N

capital structure. Transactions of such

Sources:

nature are usually termed financial

ote:

Year

Eouitv

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2OO1
2OO2

3.66%
5.O8Y"
2.190/"
2.320/0
2.37"/"
2.69"/"
5.200/"
8.87o/o
7 .7'to/o
7.327"
7.16"/"
16.25%

Other Liabilities _1/
96.34%
94.92"/"
g7.92Y"
97.6g0/0

g7.63yo
92.51"/o

94.80%
91 .1go/.

92.29%
92.68%
92.84y"

ffi.?s%

_1/ Customer's and other interests, aside shareholders,.
Annual Report & Statem ent of Accounts of the Central
Bank of Nigeria for the respective years.
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have a tendency to engage ordinarily

in creative accounting where the

system stability

of a bank having branch network of
some 23 offices is celebrated! lf it be

requirements are not tedious.

29.

Good corporale governance

so, then there should a massive

25.

requires adeq uale

tehnimlskTls of the
executive management and staff of
financial institutions. The depth and

rationalization in that institution, based
on the Pareto principle that suggests

breadth of lheir skills should enable them

other staff of that institution to mobilize
only 10% of deposits!

The newaccord is however, a
study in learning the right lessonsfrom

past experiences, by building
soundness of the financial system on
three pillars:

to appreciate fully the different risks
that the institutions are exposed to and

minimal need for as many as 518

33.

1. Quality of the

the implications of such risks. Thus,
uncertainties are not mistaken for

managemenf of the

risks, and etfective risk management

institutions.
Effective superuisionby

strategies would be adopted to the
benefit of allthe stakeholders.

the majority shareholders and/or

Marketdisciplinethrough

30.

The first issue in skills is to

executive directors. This helps to
ensure independence, but requires

2.
3.

the regulatory authorities.

ln orderto strengthen the role
of non-executive directors in corporate
governance, as much as possible they
should have no direct relationshipwilh

disclosure.

determine whether the required skills

complement of courage and integrity that

lf any of these three planks is not right,

are available or lacking in the

will not make them compromise.

good corporate governance would be

difficult to achieve and the system

management and staff of the institution.
Poor corporate governance may result

34. The separation of

could easily be compromised.

from incompetence. The second
dimension is that where the necessary

26.

important issue

managementand staff of the institution.

governance. This was initially adduced

The tendency is greater for poor

as the possible explanation for the

corporate governance because there
will be ample opportunity to misinform

extent of abuse of office in the United

financial sector?" The following section
identifies the issues that must be

good corporate

stakeholders

if

governance will become a vehicle for
ensuring stability of the financial sector.

or deceive other

31.

Skill gaps that result in poor
corporate governance can be filled in

GOVEHhIAT{CE

two obvious ways:

Both the quality ol

information provided by financial
institutions and how the information is

managed are fundamental to
corporate governance in the financial
sector. The three planks to this are:
1

.

2.
3.
28.

The information provided,
which deals with'what'.

The person providing it,

which is the 'source'.
The person in need of
it, which is the 'user'.

lf the information provided

gives a true and fair state of affairs ol
the institutions, it is high quality and
enhances good corporate governance.

The same applies if the timely

corporate

States of America, where the
combination of those offices is
prevalent- usually in the President of
the organization. But the corporate

deliberately.

MAJOR ISSUES IN CORPORATE

27.

in

skills are resident in only a few

The important question to
answer is "how will good corporate
governance ensure stability in the

emphasized

the

chairmanlrom the office of the chief
executivehas been raised as another

1.

Training and deliberate

2.

exposure of existing staff
of the institutions.
Recruitment of new staff

that already have the
required skills.

failures and frauds that occurred in the

rest of the world weakened the
argument. lndeed, the European
common business model of separation
of these offices and the two-tier Board
that is common in Germany have not

insured against poor corporate
governance. lt then brings the
argument down to lhe individuals
concerned. Some have combined both

32.

Another major factor in good
corporate governance is to appoint
knowledgeable and/or independent nonexecutive directors to the Board of
financial institutions. Such directors
would be knowledgeable enough about
the business and have the courage to

be able lo challenge and/or correct
ineffective management decisions.
Often times, what obtains is that
directors look more to the executive
management as the source of
directors' allowances and other perks
of the office, and thus turn a blind eye

i nformation is provided for stakeholder
decision-making. All these boil down
lo disclosure requirements and their
enforcement. The more of authentic
information a stakeholder has, the
easier it is for himiher to enforce good

to anomalies and obvious dubious
claims. An aberration such as a
management staff claiming
responsibility for about 90% of all

corporate governance and ensure

foreign exchange income and deposits
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offices effectively and ensured strict

observance of the ethics of their
professions, while some others
abused the privileges of such executive
powers.

35.

Since integrity is not a
currency, the modern business
organization cannot rely on individual

leaders to ensure good corporate
governance. Thus, there is growing
preference for the separation of the
chairman of the board of directors from
the chief executive officer. This should
allow one to be a check on the other,
as originally conceived. For financial

institutions, this

is

especially

important in respect of rlskassets and

other investments that they make. A

Vol.28 No.
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combined chairman/chief executive

asymmetry and analysis

(CCE)could give loan approvals for hisi

paralysisl

her other ventures that ordinarily fail

the test of the institution's risk
acceptance criteria or fall completely
out of the target market definition of
the institution.

36.

Where the

of

f

ices

are

separated, two otherworries arise on:

1.

2.

A stronger characler
among them might
dominate the other.

The possibility that the

two of them can collude
to defeat the purpose of
the office separation.
Either way, the institution can still
achieve good corporate governance if
the reporting requirements (content

and timing) are well defined and
enforced by knowledgeable and
independent non-executive

di

rectors.

There have been situations where the
information provided to directors by
management of organzations are of litfl e or

no use in decision-making, or the

board. There have been several such

cases that resulted in job losses

without any avenue for redress. There
is in fact, a particular case of a senior
staff of a financial institution that lost
his job to such disagreement and later

directors rather than assist them in

lost a new job offer because of the
follow-up vendetta of his former

making the appropriate decisions.

employers! There are yet two Nigerian-

39.

welltoday but nearly had their career
truncated by former employers that

"information overload" that conf used the

bank chief executives who are doing

Another aspect of corporate

governance is the protection for
squealers. Squealers are staff that
leak sec rets of unwholesome activities
or practices by their organizations to
regulatory or leadership authorities.
Ordinarily, such staff is seen as "black
sheep" by his/her employers and

they disagreed with on principle.

42.

Stillon the search forstrategies

for installing and ensuring good
corporate governance is an examination

of the role of external auditors. At

either get fired eventually or suffer

present, most stakeholders of Nigerian

irreparable damage to his/her career.
The argument this raises is whether

the loyalty of the staff in question
should be to the poorly governed

banking have been asking questions
about the thoroughness and liability of
external auditors, especially when they
give clean bill of health to institutions

organization or the larger society that

that subsequently collapsed. This

in
ensuring good corporate governance
is accounting standards. This has to

the organization is defrauding? lt is

phenomenon is however, not peculiarto
Nigeria, as demonstrated in the Enron/

do with accounting and reporting

in the argument that the government

requirements, which follow the rules
of the accounting profession and what

is wasteful and that the money would

the
minimum standards that business

that the executive in question has
contravened the taxation law by
engaging in tax evasion. Good
corporate governance expects that

37.

Another major issue

is universally accepted as

organizations in certain sectors of the
economy must comply with. Such
standards are peculiar for financial

more like trying to balance between an
executive that underpays corporate tax

not be utilized judiciously, and the fact

seruices, and good coporate governance

such criminal activity should be
revealed or reported to the tax

requires the cooperation of three parties

authorities.

to accounting for full compliance. The
parties are:
1

.

represented by B ditectorc
aNntanaganent

protection to a manager or staff that
reports such deliberate crime? Such
protection exists in the capital market,
ensured and enforced bythe Securities
and Exchange Commission and the

not only be a professional
but also have demorshable

institutions need to be emulated by

The external auditors

the other regulatory authorities, some

and proper reporting of the

of whose off icials do accept
gratif ication or covering up

organization's activities.

irregularities to the detriment of the

38.

The accounting and reporting
standards can indeed be extended to

internal reports, wherein the format
and information contentof such reports
would be subjected to tests of :
.
Facilitating decision-making.

-

Nigerian Stock Exchange. These

competenceforthe job.
who attest to the validity

Preventing information

position their clients take on accounting,
reporting and regulatory compliance the

audito/s duty

43.

is towards public good.

The possible directions to

consider in ensuring auditor

usually by the board of
directors and therefore,
constrains the auditor to

The pertinent question is to

what extent the system offers

accountantwho should

went down together. The direction of
pursuit now is how to ensure auditor
independence, such that no mattertire

independence include the following:
1. Their appointment, which is

The organization, wtrbh is

2. The organization's

3.

40.

Andersen saga where both organizations

f

conform to their expectation
- albeit, when she/he has

little or no regard

2.

f

or

professional integrity.

Their remuneration, which
again is fixed by the board
and could easily compromise
a myopic auditor.

For these two reasons, the auditor's
allegiance has tended to be more to

enti re financial sector.

the board of directors. Where the

41. Another angle to

directors are low in integrity, there is
a tendency for the auditor of equally
low integrity to connive with them to

the

governance matter is when a managei
ref uses to sign off an obvious

fraudulent credit that was requested

for and/or recommended by the
institution's director or chairman of the

58

violate the principles of good corporate
governance.

44.

One possible way to ensure
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auditors' independence is to fix their
tenor, i.e. the number of years the
auditors can be retained by the same
organization. A maximum period of say,
three to five years should be set for an
auditor, and thereafter, another auditor
should be appointed. Competition and
the desire to do jobs that will not create

all human societies is that where there
are no sanctions or they exist but they

are poorly enforced, the incentive for
breaking the law is very high. This is

50.

lnformation quality deals with

lhe content, which must be devoid of
deceit and provide a sound basis for
decision-making. But quality is also a

why the sanctions for erring institutions
and operators must by far outweigh the
gai ns lhey make f rom violations.

lunction of the depth of skills tor
collating the information and for

47.

The 2002 saga with respect

the required skills, risks could be taken

to foreign exchange regulation
violations that were visited by stifl
sanctions by the Central Bank of

deliberately or carelessly to the ultimate
loss of the institution and compromise
the entire sector through counter-party

is a key issue in ensuring good

Nigeria was not just a strong signal of

relationships.

corporate governance towards stability
of the financial sector.

the demand for compliance, but it

any doubt about the professional
integrity of auditors should make them
practise their trade professionally and
ethically. lndeed, auditor independence

45. There has also been the
argument tor duty of loyalty in law
to be for public good, rather

than
unrestricted loyalty to the client in the

equally was clear indication of what
to expect goingforuad. Forexample,

if

a

manager of a financial institution
misinforms the directors or regulatory

attorneys, who hold briefs for their

authorities about the status of its risk
assets, and thus prevented prompt
taking of remedial or protective action
for the bank, she/he should be
sanctioned. The same should apply

clients and seek always to secure
reprieve for their clients, even under

in cases of obvious fraud that the
institutions fail to report to the

the most ridiculous technical reasons.
A lot of this was witnessed during the
failed banks'tribunal era. ln as much
as the proceedings were not in line

regulatory authorities.

argument that she/he pays the bill.

This is especially relevant to

CONCLUSION

interpreting it. Where the institution's
management and staff are deficient in

51.

Good corporate governance
helps to strengthen and stabilize the
financial sector when every individual
operator embraces its principles. Each

compliant banker lhen spreads the
gospelthrough his/her own circle of
influence. Thus, the emphasis will be
more on self-discipline, rather than
discipline enforced from outside.

52. The ultimate aim of healthy
financial system would be elusive if
there are no sanctions lor erring
operators. lt must be ensured that
when operators break the rules, they

with the normal law practice and

48.

innocence untila competent court of

corporate governance is a majorfactor
in financial sector stability. Both at the

law rules othenruise, there was no doubt
that a good number of those charged

micro (individual) and macro (sectorwide) levels, if the institutions comply

misdemeanors. lt is important
therefore, that the regulatory

under the "decree" had explanations
to make. The primacy of public good
would recommend protection for bank
@ositors, who are the primary losers

with regulations and ensure that all
organizational activities are carried

authorities muster lhe political will lo

properly, the system will remain solid.

become necessary.

49.

53.

judicial system that presumes

whenever a bank collapses. Where the
management ancl/or directors of a

There is no doubt that good

The process however, starts

from the quality and timeliness of

financial institution were criminally

information provided by institutions for

negligent or outright fraudulent, the law

their various stakeholders. Whether

should take its normal course and
provide protection for the weakest

the stakeholders are internal or

stakeholder group.

46.

external, the same results obtain when
the information quality and timeliness
is right or poor. lf it is the former, then

Perhaps most important of all

the stakeholders can make the right

is the provision of heavy sanclbttor
those that contravene banking

decisions and responses to ensure the
health of the institution as well as that
of the entire financial sector.

regulations and other laws that guide
the business. The general pattern in
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do not get away with it. There
nothing better

to encourage

is

criminal

tendencies than unpunished

apply the sanctions when they
Good corporate governance

boils down to leadership and the
individual. As many individuals as
believe in the proper governance of
corporations should be encouraged to
strive for it, while the society at large,

and in particular, the regulatory
authorities must provide an enabling
environment for it through creating the
right frameworkfor its enforcement and

demonstrating commitment to the
process.

